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The strange survival and apparent resurgence of sociobiology 
Abstract 
A recent dispute between Richard Dawkins and Edward O. Wilson concerning fundamental 
concepts in sociobiology is examined. It is argued that sociobiology has not faired well since 
WKHVDQGWKDWLWVVXUYLYDODVDµVFLHQWLILF¶SHUVSHFWLYHhas been increasingly tenuous. 
This is, at least in part, because it has failed to move forward in the ways its developers 
anticipated, but also because it has not seen the developments in natural history, genomics 
and social science it was relying upon. It is argued that sociobiology has become a purely 
utilitarian perspective, a way of looking at things, reliant increasingly on studies of the 
EHKDYLRXURIVRFLDOLQVHFWVIRULWVµVFLHQWLILF¶FUHGHQWLDOV7KHGLVSXWHEHWZHHQ'DZNLQVDQG
Wilson is then reconsidered in this light, and it is argued that²regardless of which position 
prevails²VRFLRELRORJ\¶VSDUORXVVWDWHDVDPHDQVRIH[SODLQLQJDFWLRQLVQRZGLIILFXOWWR
disguise. 
Introduction 
In May 2012, Richard Dawkins (2012) wrote a coruscating review of Edward O. Wilson¶V
(2012a) book The Social Conquest of Earth for the magazine Prospect. He concluded: 
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3OHDVHGRUHDG:LOVRQ¶VHDUOLHUERRNVLQFOXGLQJWKHPRQXPHQWDOThe Ants, written 
jointly with Bert Hölldobler (yet another world expert who will have no truck with 
group selection). As for the book under review, the theoretical errors I have explained 
are important, pervasive, and integral to its thesis in a way that renders it impossible to 
recommend. To borrow from Dorothy Parker, this is not a book to be tossed lightly 
aside. It should be thrown with great force. And sincere regret. 
:LOVRQ¶V(2012b) response was no less impolite: 
The science in our argument has, after 18 months, never been refuted or even seriously 
challenged²and certainly not by the archaic version of inclusive fitness from the 1970s 
recited in Prospect by Professor Dawkins. While many have protested (incidentally, not 
including Steven Pinker and Robert Trivers, as Professor Dawkins claims), many others 
of equal competence are in favour of the replacement proposed. In any case, making 
such lists is futile. It should be born in mind that if science depended on rhetoric and 
polls, we would still be burning objects with phlogiston and navigating with geocentric 
maps. 
7KHRQOLQHYHUVLRQRI'DZNLQV¶VUHYLHZHOLFLWHGFRPPHQWVµEHORZWKHOLQH¶PDQ\IURP
esteemed biologists, over the following year. They demonstrated a similar failure to meet 
minds. 
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This dispute was remarkable. Firstly, the matter at hand was foundational for the perspective 
both Dawkins and Wilson share: at issue was what form the natural selection of 
FKDUDFWHULVWLFVWDNHVZKDWFRQVWLWXWHVWKHµXQLW¶RIVHOHFWLRQ'DZNLQVLQVLVWHGWKDWDQLPDOV¶
social behaviour is determined by the degree to which individuals share genes, while Wilson 
was now arguing that the group (pack, colony, etc.) is the actual unit of selection. If Wilson 
ZDVULJKWWKLVZRXOGPHDQWKHEHKDYLRXURIDQLPDOVLVGHWHUPLQHGE\WKHJURXS¶V
FRPSRVLWLRQDQGHQYLURQPHQW:LOVRQ¶VUHMHFWLRQRINLQVHOHFWLRQ'DZNLQV¶VSRVLWLRQ 
SODFHGKLPLQRSSRVLWLRQWRZKDWµVRFLRELRORJLVWV¶1 had been arguing for the previous 40 
years. 
More importantly, the fact the debate was being conducted in such a public forum at all was 
strange. Sociobiology has become a very marginal perspective in both sociology and the 
social sciences, its premises superseded by developments in the former field and rejected tout 
court by the vast majority of practitioners in the latter. Nevertheless, the dispute drew 
hundreds of biologists into the controversy. This mirrored the reaction to a previous paper co-
authored by Wilson and published in the journal Nature (Nowak et al., 2010), arguing for 
group selection, which elicited a refutation signed by 137 leading biologists (Abbot et al., 
2011), four separate critical rejoinders (Boomsma et al., 2011; Ferriere and Michod, 2011; 
Herre and Wcislo, 2011; Strassmann et al., 2011) as well as a number of critical papers 
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 7KHWHUPµVRFLRELRORJ\¶LVXVHGWKURXJKRXWWKLVSDSHUWRLQGLFDWHWKHFRPPRQOLQHVRI
argument of :LOVRQ¶V(2000, originally 1975) 6RFLRELRORJ\DQG'DZNLQV¶V(Dawkins, 2006a) 
The Selfish Gene. These are elaborated in the next section. 
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published elsewhere (e.g., Rousset and Lion, 2011)*LYHQVRFLRELRORJ\¶VPDUJLQDOLW\ZK\
did a proposed conceptual shift in its explanatory framework elicit such a strong disciplinary 
response? 
This paper is an attempt to answer that question. It will be argued that the arguments in 
Nature and Prospect, although about the same topic, were actually conducted on radically 
different grounds: the former was a dispute about evolutionary biology, the latter about a 
philosophical view of how behaviour should be understood. This was the result of 
VRFLRELRORJ\¶V initial statement of intent being diluted over the years to a point where it only 
has purchase in two spheres: understanding (some of) the behaviour of social insects and 
providing a philosophically-grounded theory of human behaviour. This theory will be shown 
to be utilitarianism in a scientific costume, and²as with utilitarianism more generally²it has 
proved fairly resilient in the face of empirical challenges. The (attempted) movement from 
kin to group selection, however, poses an existential threat to the perspective and leaves it 
EDGO\ZHDNHQHGZKHWKHURUQRW:LOVRQ¶VDUJXPHQWVEHFRPHPRUHZLGHO\DGRSWHG%HIRUH
WKLVKRZHYHULWZLOOEHQHFHVVDU\WRGHVFULEHZKDWVRFLRELRORJ\¶VSULPDU\FODLPVDUH 
What is sociobiology? 
6RFLRELRORJ\LVWKHµV\VWHPDWLFstudy of the biological basis of all social behaviour¶(Wilson, 
2000: 4), including behaviour occurring between interacting organisms of the same species, 
between parasites and hosts, and between predators and prey. It places a particular emphasis 
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on the relationships between behaviour and evolutionary trends: behaviours are understood in 
UHODWLRQWRWKHTXHVWLRQµ+RZGRHVGRLQJWKLVSURPRWHIHUWLOLW\EUHHGLQJORQJHYLW\DQGVR
RQ"¶$QLPDOEHKDYLRXULVFRQVWUXHGDVWKHPHDQVE\ZKLFKJHQHWLFLQIRUPDWLRQis 
WUDQVPLWWHGDQLPDOVSKHQRW\SHVDUHWKHYHKLFOHVWKURXJKZKLFKSDUWLFXODU'1$µFRGHV¶
(genotypes) are transmitted, and their activities are therefore understood in relation to the 
ways in which they promote the spread of particular genes throughout a population. Genes, in 
turn²because they determine what behaviours will or will not be exhibited²are more or less 
µVXFFHVVIXO¶GHSHQGLQJRQZKHWKHUWKHWUDLWVWKH\FRQWUROIRUPDNHWKHRUJDQLVPPRUH
µVXFFHVVIXO¶UHSURGXFWLYHO\WKXVSDVVLQJWKRVHWUDLWVRQto more offspring. Such genetically-
determined traits will spread through a population more than those which fail to promote 
UHSURGXFWLYHµVXFFHVV¶,QVKRUWVRFLRELRORJ\PDNHVWKHWKHRUHWLFDODVVXPSWLRQWKDWDOO
behaviour is genetically determined in the last instance. 
This assumption, however, opens up two problems. Firstly, some highly social creatures do 
not breed, and therefore pass on their genes, at all. Female naked mole rats, for instance, are 
sterile throughout their lives unless their colony queen, which does reproduce, dies. In this 
event one or more may become fertile, leading to conflict and competition between those that 
do. This eusocial EHKDYLRXUZDVQRWHGE\'DUZLQDVEHLQJµRQHVSHFLDOGLIILFXOW\ZKLFKDW
first appeared to me insuperable, and actually fatal to my whole theory¶(Darwin, 2008: 75).2 
                                                 
2
 2QHRI'DUZLQ¶VVROXWLRQVWRWKLVSUREOHPZDVWKDWVHOHFWLRQRSHUDWHGDWWKHJURXSOHYHODV
ZHOODVWKHLQGLYLGXDOµ>W@KLVGLIILFXOW\DOWKRXJKDSSHDULQJLQVXSHUDEOHLVOHVVHQHGRUDV,
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The discovery of DNA, and an increasing research consensus around the transmission of 
JHQHWLFPDWHULDODVWKHNH\GULYHUEHKLQGHYROXWLRQUHQGHUHGWKLVµGLIILFXOW\¶HYHQPRUH
problematic. 
Secondly, some²sometimes quite a lot of²animal behaviour does not seem to be self-
interested in this way at all. Some animals, for instance, place themselves in jeopardy to 
SURWHFWRQHDQRWKHUDVZKHQPHHUNDWVDFWDVµORRNRXWV¶IRUWKHUHVWRIWKHLUFRORQ\E\
watching for predators instead of feeding, grooming, mating, and so on. Lives are sacrificed 
to save those of others, as when bees sting animals that pose a threat to their colony. How can 
such behaviour be in the interest of the animal exhibiting it? 
Dawkins (2006a, originally published in 1976) sought to address these difficulties by 
UHGHILQLQJWKHPHDQLQJRIWKHZRUGµLQWHUHVW¶5DWKHUWKDQthe organism having particular 
QHHGVUHTXLUHPHQWVSUHIHUHQFHVDQGVRRQµLQWHUHVWV¶ZHUHGHILQHGLQgenetic terms. Genes, 
rather than organisms, seek to replicate themselves, and animals are the vehicles through 
which that replication occurs: animal behaviour, in short, becomes a by-product of the 
imperatives of genes. Both problems²eusociality and altruism²disappear if they can be 
shown to promote the interests of genes over and above the apparent requirements of their 
bearer organisms. 
                                                 
believe, disappears, when it is remembered that selection may be applied to the family, as 
ZHOODVWRWKHLQGLYLGXDODQGPD\WKXVJDLQLWVGHVLUHGHQG¶(Darwin, 2008: 177). 
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'DZNLQV¶VZRUNEXLOWRQWKHZRUNRI+DPLOWRQ(1964a, 1964b), who provided the first 
modern (post-'1$WKHRUHWLFDOPRGHORIDµOLPLted restraint on selfish competitive behaviour 
and possibility of limited self-VDFULILFHV¶(Hamilton, 1964a: 1). Hamilton sought to 
comprehensively quantify the relationships between genetic benefit and social behaviour. 
This relationship was not limited just to eusocial or altruistic behaviour²indeed, it could not 
EHDVWKHGLYLVLRQRIDFWLYLWLHVLQWRFDWHJRULHVOLNHµDOWUXLVWLF¶DQGµVHOILVK¶LVDOLHQWR
biology²but rather to any LQWHUDFWLRQVEHWZHHQUHODWHGRUJDQLVPVµ+DPLOWRQ¶VUXOH¶DV
interpreted by Wilson (Wilson, 2000: 3) can be summarised as rb > c (behaviour is exhibited 
where the relatedness of the participants, r, multiplied by the benefit to the recipient, b, is 
greater than the cost, c, to the acting organism). The implications of this care clear: 
This means that for a hereditary tendency to perform an action of this kind to evolve the 
benefit to a sib[ling] must average at least twice the loss to the individual, the benefit to 
a half-sib must be at least four times the loss, to a cousin eight times and so on. To 
express the matter more vividly, in the world of our model organisms, whose behaviour 
is determined strictly by genotype, we expect to find that no one is prepared to sacrifice 
his life for any single person but that everyone will sacrifice it when he can thereby 
save more than two brothers, or four half-EURWKHUVRUHLJKWILUVWFRXVLQV« (Hamilton, 
1964a: 16). 
7KHFOHDUHVWH[HPSODURI+DPLOWRQ¶VDUJXPHQWLVWKHEHKDYLRXURIDQWV,QDQWFRORQLHVonly 
the queen lays eggs. If these are unfertilised (haploid) the offspring will be male, if fertilised 
(diploid) female. Males mating with their mother thus produce sterile female offspring which, 
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on average, share 75% of their genes. Thus a high degree of relatedness between members of 
the colony provides both for non-reproducing members (who can ensure the propagation of 
their genes by maximising the survival chances of their fertile brothers and mother) and for 
their willingness to jeopardise themselves for other colony members. 
+DPLOWRQ¶VUule provides for three types of social behaviour: altruism, selfishness and spite 
(Wilson, 2000: 118±9). µ$OWUXLVP¶DFFRXQWVIRUWKHH[DPSOHRIDQWVJLYHQDERYHZKLOH
µVHOILVKQHVV¶LVWKHPRUHURXWLQHSXUVXLWRIJHQHWLFVHOI-LQWHUHVWµ6SLWH¶DFFRXQWVIRU those 
situations in which an individual deliberately reduces the fitness of an unrelated competitor 
without any personal gain (even sometimes incurring a personal loss) in order to increase the 
fitness of one or more closely related others. Social stability is handled with the concept of 
the evolutionary stable strategy (ESS), derived from game theory.3 ,QDQµDOWUXLVWLF¶
FRPPXQLW\DQ\RQHµVHOILVK¶RUJDQLVPZRXOGEHDEOHWRDFFUXHGLVSURSRUWLRQDWHDGYDQWDJHV
to itself. This, however, would lead to the gene for that selfish behaviour spreading 
throughout the population²DVWKHµVHOILVK¶RUJDQLVPZRXOGEUHHGPRUHWKDQLWVµDOWUXLVWLF¶
counterparts²reducing the proportion of altruistic to selfish actors. If left unchecked, 
selfishness would thus become the predominant mode of behaviour, leading, in turn, to small 
numbers of mutually co-operating altruistic individuals thereby accruing disproportionate 
advantages to themselves. Groups would potentially oscillate between altruism and 
selfishness, with the minority behaviour tending to be most advantageous to those organisms 
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 This appears to be the only aspect of social scientific thought incorporated into 
sociobiological theory. 
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that exhibit it. In fact, according to Dawkins (2006a: 69), such oscillations tend towards 
stability. 
Wilson and Dawkins together provided a comprehensive theory of social behaviour, based on 
+DPLOWRQ¶VUXOH²which accounts for why individuals do what they do, motivated by the 
demands of their genes²and evolutionary stable strategies²to account for social stability 
and to provide social constraints on individual actions.4 
6RFLRELRORJ\¶Vcritics 
Sociobiology was never uncontroversial: both Dawkins and Wilson argued that its tenets 
could account for all forms of animal behaviour, including human actions.5 Its survival as a 
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 This is very much an overview of both VRFLRELRORJ\¶VFODLPVDQGWKHFRQWURYHUVLHVLW
caused. Segerstråle (2001) provides the definitive overview of the perspective and its critics, 
while Dupré (2001, 2003) cogently outlines the philosophical issues around contemporary 
Darwinist thought. Both HPSKDVLVHWKHFHQWUDOLW\RI+DPLOWRQ¶VDUJXPHQWVWRWKH
perspective¶VFODLPV 
5
 Dawkins did allow for some non-biological influences on human culture, but these were 
mediated through the concept of the meme, a self-replicating unit of culture²µWXQHVLGHDV, 
catch-SKUDVHVFORWKHVIDVKLRQVZD\VRIPDNLQJSRWVRUEXLOGLQJDUFKHV¶ (Dawkins, 2006a)²
controlled by similar patterns of selection, adaptation and extinction to the gene. Those that 
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coherent perspective depended on its capacity to maintain this claim. Over the course of the 
late 1970s and early 1980s this claim was systematically demolished²or so it seemed. In 
fact, the early critics of sociobiological explanation failed to persuade Wilson, Dawkins, or 
their followers, that their perspective did not work. For the purposes of brevity four lines of 
criticism will be outlined: political, natural historical, anthropological and philosophical.6 
6RFLRELRORJ\¶VSROLWLFDOFULWLFVIRFXVHGRQLWVFRQJUXHQFHZLWKIUHH-market economics and 
Hobbesian self-LQWHUHVW,IDOOEHKDYLRXULVXOWLPDWHO\µVHOILVK¶LQPRWLYDWLRQWKHUHDUH
biologically-driven limits on the possibilities for co-operative or progressive social change. 
:LOVRQ¶VZRUNLQSDUWLFXODUZDVFRQVWUXHGDVMXVWDQRWKHUDWWHPSWWRµSURYH¶WKDWVXFKVRFLDO
change was impossible, PDNLQJLQHTXDOLW\DQGVRFLDOFRQIOLFWRXWWREHµQDWXUDO¶VWDWHVRI
affairs. The most comprehensive criticism of this sort was collected in the book Not in Our 
Genes, written by the biologist Steven Rose, the psychologist Leon Kamin and the geneticist 
                                                 
VSUHDGDFURVVFXOWXUHVRUSHUVLVWRYHUWLPHDUHEHWWHUµVXUYLYDOPDFKLQHV¶WKDQWKHLUPRUH
parochial or ephemeral counterparts. Dawkins acknowledged that this was a speculative 
K\SRWKHVLVUDWKHUWKDQDµILQGLQJ¶ 
6
 This is an analytical typology for explanatory purposes and should not be taken to be a 
FRPSUHKHQVLYHRYHUYLHZRIWKHFULWLFV¶SRVLWLRQVtout court*RXOGDGGUHVVHG:LOVRQ¶V
conceptual confusion and dogmatism as well as his explanatory form, Rose et al. carefully 
examined his slapdash treatment of empirical materials as well as criticising the ideology it 
leads to, and so on. Types of criticism have been attributed to those authors who most clearly 
advance them. 
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Richard Lewontin (Rose et al., 1984). They question the scientific precepts of sociobiology 
from a range of perspectives and find it wanting in all, concluding that its explanations 
GHSHQGRQUHGXFWLRQLVPDQGµYXOJDU¶XQGHUVWDQGLQJVRIERWKJHQHWLFVDQGHYROXWLRQDU\
science: 
Sociobiology is yet another attempt to put a natural scientific foundation under Adam 
Smith. It combines vulgar Mendelism, vulgar Darwinism, and vulgar reductionism in 
the service of the status quo (Rose et al., 1984: 264). 
0DQ\QDWXUDOKLVWRULDQVDUJXHGWKDWWKHPDWHULDOVRQZKLFKVRFLRELRORJ\¶VFODLPVUHVWHGZHUH
inaccurate. Gould (1978), for instance, citHGDVWXG\RIµMHDORXV\¶LQPRXQWDLQEOXHELUGVLQ
which a dummy male was displayed in nests at various times over the mating season (Barash, 
1976). Mating males were found to be more aggressive toward this dummy before eggs were 
laid than after, providing an apparent warrant for the claim that aggression is most marked 
ZKHQWKHUHLVDJUHDWHUFKDQFHRIWKHPDOH¶VJHQHVEHLQJXVXUSHGE\WKRVHRIDQRWKHULH
SULRUWRWKHSRLQWDWZKLFKWKHPDOHµNQRZV¶WKHIHPDOHKDVEHHQLQVHPLQDWHG*RXOGVLPSO\
pointed out that the decrease in aggression could equally plausibly be the result of the male 
having worked out that the dummy male is, in fact, just a dummy²something which fits the 
facts equally well. 
*RXOG¶VEURDGHUFULWLTXHZDVWKDWVRFLRELRORJLFDOµH[SODQDWLRQ¶GHSHQGHGRQDQLQYHUVLRQRI
REVHUYDWLRQDQGWKHRU\ZKHUHE\WKHODWWHUZDVXVHGWRµPDNHVHQVH¶RIWKHIRUPHUUDWKHUWKDQ
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EHLQJGHULYHGIURPLW+HDUJXHGWKDWVRFLRELRORJ\ZDVDIRUPRIµMXVW-VR¶H[SODQDWLRQOLWWOH
different to how fundamentalists invoke the concept of God: 
When evolutionists study individual adaptations, when they try to explain form and 
behaviour by reconstructing history and assessing current utility, they also tell just-so 
stories²and the agent is natural selection. Virtuosity in invention replaces testability as 
the criterion for acceptance (Gould, 1978: 530). 
Social anthropological findings further seemed to confound the possibility of sociobiological 
explanations being applicable to humans. Sahlins (1976), for instance, considered the ways in 
ZKLFKDQWKURSRORJLFDOHYLGHQFHPLJKWEHXVHGWRWHVW:LOVRQ¶VDUJXPHQWWKDWELRORJLFDO
imperatives account for human behaviour. Polynesian cultures, which were most likely to 
exemplify kin selection (for structural and cultural reasons), proved to be ones in which 
infanticide and adoption were practiced more, rather than less, frequently than elsewhere. 
Indeed, Sahlins found no compelling evidence of social organisation that supported 
sociobiological principles in the anthropological literature at all: 
Whether the scientific sociobiology will succeed in its ambition of incorporating the 
human sciences depends largely on the fate of its theory of kin selection. This is true 
for several reasons. One is the significance of kinship in the so-called primitive 
societies, from which may be inferred its importance throughout the earlier and greater 
portion of human history ... But there is still another issue which makes the problem 
doubly critical ... [i]f kinship is not ordered by individual reproductive success, and if 
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kinship is admittedly central to human social behaviour, then the project of an 
encompassing sociobiology collapses (Sahlins, 1976: 17±18). 
Finally, philosophical critics such as Midgley (1979) and Stove (1992) exposed the 
conceptual confusion and fuzzy terminology in sociobiological explanations. Dawkins, for 
LQVWDQFHFDUHOHVVO\DSSOLHGWKHDGMHFWLYHµVHOILVK¶WRboth genes and organisms, even though 
the latter usage makes no sense in his explanatory schema. More importantly, Midgley 
DUJXHGWKHQRWLRQWKDWWKHZRUGµVHOILVK¶FRXOGEHXVHGDVWRLQGLFDWHDQDWWULEXWHRIFKDLQVRI
nucleotides was absurd tout court: it makes no sense WRGHVFULEHJHQHVDVµVHOILVK¶µ>J@HQHV
cannot be selfish or unselfish any more than atoms can be jealous, elephants abstract or 
ELVFXLWVWHOHRORJLFDO¶ (Midgley, 1979: 439). Stove developed this argument by pointing out 
WKDWµVHOI-UHSOLFDWLQJ¶DQGµVHOILVK¶DUHQRWFRJQDWHFRQFHSWVµ>L@t makes no sense to say of a 
virus that it is selfish, any more than it makes sense to say of an electron that it is suspicious, 
of a triangle that it is supercilious, or of a number that it is sex-mad¶(Stove, 1992: 68). He 
went on: 
If you cannot get, without fudging, from self-replication to selfishness even in the 
behavioural sense, then you certainly cannot get from self-replication to selfishness in 
the ordinary sense. Yet it is not really open to doubt that it was the ordinary sense of 
WKHZRUGWKDWWKRXJKFRQVWDQWO\GLVDYRZHGµFDUULHG¶'DZNLQV¶VERRNZLWKLWVUHDGHUV
Suppose that, before publishing it, Dawkins actually had done what he says it was 
DOZD\VRSHQIRUKLPRUDQ\RQHHOVHWRGRµWUDQVODWH¶HYHU\UHIHUHQFHWRVHOILVKness in 
WKHERRNµEDFNLQWRUHVSHFWDEOHWHUPV¶DERXWVHOI-replication. What would have been 
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the result? The title would have been The Self-Replicating Gene, which is about as 
interesting as watching paint dry or as entitling a book on cats The Fish-Eating Cat 
(Stove, 1992: 72). 
6RFLRELRORJ\¶VFODLPVWKHUHIRUHwere rejected by scholars from a variety of disciplines, 
WDNLQJPXOWLSOHOLQHVRIDWWDFN7KH\ZHUHSROLWLFDOO\PRWLYDWHGEDVHGRQµMXVW-VR¶
explanations, incompatible with the findings of social anthropology and natural history, and 
rested on unclear concepts and muddled thinking. This did not, however, put Wilson and 
Dawkins, or their followers, off. They had responses to their critics, and sociobiology was 
able to survive²in a way. It depended for its survival on three claims: 
1. that it retained empirical veracity in accounting for (at least some) animal behaviour; 
2. that it could extend this to account for (at least some) human behaviour; and 
3. that it would (eventually) have its claims verified by developments in genomics. 
How sociobiologists handled these claims would determine whether the perspective could 
survive, and what explanatory form it would take. 
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6RFLRELRORJ\¶VVWUDQJHVXUYLYDO 
Sociobiological explanation still has a role in mainstream biology, which has allowed its 
adherents to claim it retains empirical validity. The fact that some animal behaviour can, very 
SODXVLEO\EHXQGHUVWRRGDVSURPRWLQJWKHµVHOILVK¶UHSOLFDWLRQRf genes does a lot of work. 
The behaviour of eusocial insects has been central to this line of argument: self-sacrifice 
among worker ants and the organisation of fertility and reproduction in an ant colony are 
SHUVSLFXRXVH[DPSOHVRIZKHUHµJHQH-VHOILVK¶Dccounts of behaviour provide a best fit to the 
empirical data. Thus, for example, queen leaf-cutter ants of the species Acromyrmex 
echinatior PDWHZLWKPXOWLSOHPDOHVZKLOHJHQHWLFDOO\VLPLODUµVRFLDOSDUDVLWH¶TXHHQDQWVRI
the species Acromyrmex insinuator have reverted to monogamy (Sumner et al., 2004). This 
EHKDYLRXUFDQUHDGLO\EHDFFRXQWHGIRUXVLQJ+DPLOWRQ¶VUXOHWKHbenefits of polyandry²
such as greater genetic diversity among sterile workers and the production of genetically 
varied daughter queens²are specific to genuinely social insects:KHUHLQVHFWVDUHµVRFLDOO\
SDUDVLWLF¶LHWKH\WDNHDGYDQWDJHRIOLYLQJLQDVRFLDOhost colony but produce only sexually 
active offspring which take flight on reaching maturity) such benefits are less important, and 
so monogamous mating behaviour becomes more useful. Similar arguments have been used 
to account for, for example, the mating rituals of birds (Cronin, 1991). 
These kinds of argument are relatively benign within natural history+DPLOWRQ¶VUXOHLVXVHG
as a rule of thumb, to see in each case if apparently strange behaviour can be accounted for on 
the basis of genetic determinism. In some cases, as with the leaf-cutter parasite ants, a strong 
case can be made; in others (e.g., %DUDVK¶VPRXQWDLQEOXHELUGVFODLPVZHUHZHDNHU
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6RFLRELRORJLVWVZHUHDOZD\VKRZHYHUDEOHWRFODLPWKDWWKHVHµZHDNHU¶FODLPVFRXOGEH
strengthened as further data were obtained: in each case the reason observed behaviour and 
gene-selfish theory could not readily be brought into alignment with one another was because 
more data were required to account for the behaviour. This line of argument originally 
derived from Hamilton himself, who argued that his model could account for Emperor 
SHQJXLQVµIRVWHULQJ¶RWKHUV¶HJJVZKHQWKHLURZQFKLFNVIDLOHGWRVXUYLYHLQFXEDWLRQ 
As regards the already mentioned fostering passion shown by Emperor Penguins that 
have lost their chicks, some doubt as to whether the observations have been correctly 
LQWHUSUHWHGZRXOGVHHPWRUHPDLQ«%XWWDNLQJWKHVWDWHPHQWVDWWKHLUIDFHYDOXHZH
might suggest for instance, that it has something to do with heat-conservation. Perhaps 
the parent penguin is so closely adapted to living with its offspring that it is, at the stage 
in question, at a positive disadvantage without a chick nestling in the brood-pouch. But 
such a situation would hardly come into being unless there were strong general 
relationship within the flock. We seem to need to postulate this in any case to explain 
some other social behaviour of penguins, for example, the way Adelie Penguins parents 
are said to leave their young in the care of only a few adults while they go off on long 
fishing expeditions. On the other hand, some apparently social behaviour such as the 
formation of the crêche in severe weather is easily interpretable as being almost entirely 
selfish (Hamilton, 1964b: 50). 
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In short, because some animal behaviour can be plausibly accounted for by sociobiological 
theory, all animal behaviour will be²once we have more detailed information to show how it 
actually works. 
Secondly, sociobiology needed to retain its claim to be able to account for human as well as 
animal behaviour. To allow one species to be exempt from genetic determinism would 
undermine the project as a whole, as such an exemption would complicate the explanatory 
V\VWHPDVZLWK'DZNLQV¶VPHPHVDQGpotentially open the door to other exemptions. 
Accounting for human behaviour in Darwinist terms was therefore an ongoing priority, and 
was addressed in two ways: by reframing understandings of cognition and brain biology in 
HYROXWLRQDU\WHUPVDQGE\DGYDQFLQJDµVFLHQWLVWLF¶DSSURDFKWRWKHµLUUDWLRQDO¶ 
6WHYHQ3LQNHU¶VZork on language acquisition is central to the first of these lines of attack. 
Pinker (1994) argued that ODQJXDJHLVQRWµOHDUQHG¶EXWUDWKHUµDFTXLUHG¶DWDNH\VWDJHLQ
child development, during which humans are uniquely capable of recognising the linguistic 
rules of their community. No other animals have this capacity, and a failure to acquire 
linguistic skills at this stage of development means they will struggle to do so later on. Pinker 
believed that this capacity was hard-wired into the brain, in the IRUPRIDµPHWD-JUDPPDU¶
capable of picking up the specific grammars of the community the child is a part of. He 
IXUWKHUDUJXHGWKDWWKLVSDUWRIWKHEUDLQDQGLWVµDFWLYDWLRQ¶DWDVSHFLILFGHYHORSPHQWDO
phase, was driven by evolution: the capacity for language was selected as a means of solving 
the problems of communication in early hunter-gatherer societies. 
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These ideas are central for three reasons. Firstly, Pinker locates complex human behaviour as 
VRPHWKLQJHYROXWLRQDULO\DGDSWLYHLWLVQRWµVRFLDO¶ LQWKHILUVWLQVWDQFHEXWµVHOHFWHG¶EHFDXVH
it²at some stage in the past²maximised the chances of survival as humans (and their social 
activities) evolved. Secondly, he makes behaviour like speech out to be organised in parallel 
with brain development and activity: what people do becomes the manifestation of neural 
activity, and being able to describe that neural activity will come to account for the behaviour 
in total. Thirdly, he chooses language as his central area of investigation: if this 
quintessentLDOO\VRFLDODQGµOHDUQHG¶DFWLYLW\FDQEHVKRZQWREHHYROYHGELRORJLFDOO\EDVHG
and innate, it will be far easier to bring other human activities under the auspices of Darwinist 
explanation. 
3LQNHU¶VZRUNLVDOVRDNH\UHVRXUFHIRUWKHVHFRQGVRFLRELRORgical approach to human 
EHKDYLRXUDIDLWKLQµSURJUHVV¶Pinker (2011) argues that there has been a steady decline in 
violence among humans, DVµFLYLOLVLQJ¶IRUFHVKDYHEHFRPHVWURQJHUDQGPRUHVWDEOH7KLV
parallels the work of Wilson (1998), on the synthesis of the social sciences and humanities 
(under the auspices of evolutionary biology), and Dennett (1995), on the self-interested 
evolution of morality and ethics7KHIRUPRIµSURJUHVV¶DGYDQFHGE\WKHVHZULWHUVLVRQHWKDW
typically points towards scientific rationality as the high-water mark of human evolution²
particularly in its Darwinist form, of course²and is strongly critical of contemporary 
manifestations oIµLUUDWLRQDOLW\¶SDUWLFXODUO\SRVWPRGHUQLVPDQGRWKHUIRUPVRIUHODWLYLVW
thought. The strongly secular bent of these thinkers is revealed in the anti-religious 
arguments of Wilson (Sarchet, 2015), Dawkins (2006b) and others. 
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The sociobiological account of human behaviour, then, has relied on two lines of attack: 
arguing that evolutionary adaption accounts for complex social activities that appear to be 
µOHDUQHG¶DQGUHIUDPLQJKXPDQKLVWRU\DVWKHWULXPSKRIUHDVRQVFLHQFHDQGRUGHURYHU
irrationality and violence²where sociobiological explanations themselves are the key 
exemplars of reasonable, scientific and orderly thought. 
Finally, sociobiology needed to show that genetic regularities were responsible for particular 
forms of behaviour. Similarly to how Pinker argued that neural development and brain 
structure underpinned language use, sociobiologists sought to argue that repetitive and 
FKDUDFWHULVWLFEHKDYLRXUPXVWEHWKHPDQLIHVWDWLRQRIWKHDFWLRQVRIJHQHVZKLFKµFRGH¶IRU 
that behaviour. As Dawkins (replying to Midgley) argued: 
I am searching for a chunk of chromosomal material which, in practice, behaves as a 
unit for long enough to be naturally selected at the expense of another such fuzzy unit. I 
agree that there are difficulties in this way of looking at evolution, but I believe I have 
shown them to be less great than the difficulties inherent in any other way that has been 
suggested (Dawkins, 1981: 569). 
$VORQJDVVXFKµFKXQNVRIFKURPRVRPDOPDWHULDO¶FRXOGEHSRVLWHG to exist, to be capable of 
discovery, VRFLRELRORJLFDOH[SODQDWLRQVFRXOGUHO\RQDK\SRWKHWLFDOµSURRI¶WREHIRXQGGRZQ
the line and²at least²stave off the accusation that they had been shown to have no validity 
at the genetic level. 
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Put together, these are remarkably thin justifications for saying WKDWVRFLRELRORJ\µVXUYLYHG¶
its critics. Apart from (some of) the behaviour of eusocial insects, the perspective came to 
rely on a series of promissory notes: that natural historical evidence would start to reveal the 
evolutionary bases of other behaviour in other animals, that neurobiology would start to 
provide data showing the neural bases of complex human behaviour, that secular and rational 
social progress would continue across the world, and that the developing science of genomics 
ZRXOGVWDUWWRUHYHDOJHQHVµIRU¶EHKDYLRXUVLQWKHVDPHZD\LWVKRXOGVKRZKRZWKHUHDUH
JHQHVµIRU¶SK\VLFDOWUDLWV 
None of these things reliably or uncontroversially came to pass. Natural historians have 
continued to deepen their understanding of animal behaviour, but this increasing detail has 
not revealed a common, genetic, form of explanation underpinning them as a whole. 
Developments in brain scanning have apparently revealed some parallels between emotion 
and brain activity (e.g., Fisher et al., 2005), but these are controversial and have had little 
impact on the psychology, philosophy or sociology of emotion. The world is perhaps not 
getting better²although in evolutionary terms there has not been enough time to determine 
whether or not that is the case. Finally, most troublingly, genomics has not foXQGJHQHVµIRU¶
behaviour. Indeed, as the discipline has developed, increasing number of geneticists have cast 
GRXEWRQWKHLGHDWKDWWKHUHFDQEHJHQHVµIRU¶DQ\WKLQJDWDOO(Barnes and Dupré, 2008: 56). 
What these developments reveal is not the resilience of sociobiology but its character as an 
approachDµFRUUHFW¶ZD\WRVWXG\EHKDYLRXUIt is a flexible and loose rubric for putting 
together different claims under the auspices of a heuristic-based theory of how the world 
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works. 7RXVH3DUVRQV¶V(1937: 51) WHUPLQRORJ\LWLVDµVXEV\VWHP(or, perhaps better, an 
interrelated group of several sub-subsystems) of the theory of action¶,WLVutilitarianism. 
Sociobiology is utilitarianism 
Sociobiology has been accused of being a utilitarian perspective before, but this has generally 
been in the narrow sense of Hobbesian notions of self-interest (Sullivan, 1982). In a rather 
RGGDUJXPHQW6XOOLYDQFRQWUDVWVDµ+REEHVLDQ¶SRLQWRIYLHZLQZKLFKDOODOWUXLVPLV
necessarily self-VHUYLQJLQWKHILQDODQDO\VLVZLWKDµ0DU[LDQ¶SHUVSHFWLYHLQZKLFKµDOWUXLVP
LVPDQ¶VQDWXUDORULHQWDWLRQ¶(Sullivan, 1982: 274)+HFRQFOXGHVWKDWWKHµVRFLRELRORJLFDO
analysis of altruism LVFOHDUO\+REEHVLDQDQGQRW0DU[LVW¶(Sullivan, 1982: 274). The defining 
feature of this argument is its shallownessµ8WLOLWDULDQLVP¶DQGµ0DU[LVP¶DUHLQYRNHGDV
means of classifying selfishness rather than as means of examining more deeply the logic and 
JUDPPDURIWKHVRFLRELRORJLFDOSHUVSHFWLYH,QWKLVVHQVHDWOHDVW6XOOLYDQ¶VDSSURDFKVKDUHV
DSUREOHPFRPPRQWRPDQ\RIVRFLRELRORJ\¶VRWKHUFULWLFVKLVDQDO\VLVWDNHVSODFHRQWHUUDLQ
ODUJHO\FKRVHQE\VRFLRELRORJ\¶VDGKHUHQWV7 It is, however, possible to go deeper by 
examining sociobiology²in the form it retained²ZLWKUHIHUHQFHWR3DUVRQV¶VPRUH
analytical description of utilitarianism as a programme. 
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 See also Scoccia (1990) for a more polemical reversal of this argument, in which 
VRFLRELRORJ\LVXVHGWRGHIHQGµKDUG¶XWLOLWDULDQLVPDJDLQVWLWVFULWLFV 
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3DUVRQV¶VZRUNLVSDUWLFXODUO\UHOHYDQWLQWKLVUHJDUGIRUWKUHHUHDVRQV)LUVWO\KHUHFRJQLVHd 
that utilitarianism as a system of thought moved beyond the narrower arguments of Hobbes 
and became a way of construing the nature of social life and social action tout court. Rather 
than treating it as a philosophical perspective, therefore, he examined it as a persuasive and 
organised theoretical movement. Secondly, he considered it not from the point of view of the 
claims its advocates made but in relation to the grammar and logic of its arguments: he 
viewed utilitarianism as a particular way of looking at things that could be compared with 
competing ways and found to rest on particular, different, analytical decisions. Finally, and 
for our purposes, most importantly, Parsons viewed the movement as something with a 
history of its own. It emerged at a particular time, for particular theoretical and practical 
reasons, and its decline was the result of both internal contradictions (in particular an 
increasing concern with troubling residual matters that it was incapable of handling) and 
external pressures (the growth of positivism and the voluntaristic and normative theories of 
Durkheim and, in particular, Weber as both developments within and responses to that 
growth). 8VLQJ3DUVRQV¶VDQDO\VLVWKHUHIRUHDOORZVVRFLRELRORJ\WREHWUHDWHGDVD
movement, with a particular theoretical grammar, subject to both internal and external 
pressures. 
Parsons (Parsons, 1937: 51±60) defined utilitarianism as the theoretical action system 
characterised by four features: atomism, rationality, empiricism and randomness of ends. 
$WRPLVPLVµDVWURQJWHQGHQF\WRFRQVLGHUPDLQO\WKHSURSHUWLHVRIFRQFHSWXDOO\LVRODWHGXQLW
DFWVDQGWRLQIHUWKHSURSHUWLHVRIV\VWHPVRIDFWLRQRQO\E\DSURFHVVRI³GLUHFW´
JHQHUDOLVDWLRQIURPWKHVH¶ (Parsons, 1937: 52)%RWK+DPLOWRQ¶VDFFRXQWRf interactional 
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EHKDYLRXUDQGWKHFRQFHSWRI(66VFOHDUO\IDOOXQGHUWKLVUXEULF7KHµXQLW¶RIDFWLRQLQ
sociobiology is that between interacting organisms²evaluated by the relative costs and 
benefits this interaction will bring each participant, in terms of the chances of preserving and 
distributing their genetic make-up²rather than, for instance, those actions being understood 
in terms of their relevance to the costs and benefits they might bring to the group as a whole. 
The group is no more than the sum of the actions of its members. 
Rationality, for Parsons, is a slippier concept, but²in its simplest form² can be stated thus: 
µ>D@FWLRQLVUDWLRQDOLQVRIDUDVLWSXUVXHVHQGVSRVVLEOHZLWKLQWKHFRQGLWLRQVRIWKHVLWXDWLRQ
and by the means which, among those available to the actor, are intrinsically best adapted to 
WKHHQGIRUUHDVRQVXQGHUVWDQGDEOHDQGYHULILDEOHE\SRVLWLYHHPSLULFDOVFLHQFH¶ (Parsons, 
1937: 58). Again, this clearly describes sociobiology. Organisms behave in ways that make 
sense in terms of their genetic imperatives and, in each and every case, their actions can be 
VKRZQWREHµUDWLRQDO¶LQUHODWLRQWRWKHLPSHUDWLYHVRIWKHLUJHQHV. +DPLOWRQ¶VGHVFULSWLRQRI
(PSHURUSHQJXLQVDQG%DUDVK¶VDFFRXQWRIPRXQWDLQEOXHELUGVVKRZWKLVUDWLonality in full: 
whatever these creatures are doing must be understood in terms of a means±ends relationship 
where the end being pursued is to reproduce more effectively. 
Here, we can see a tension in how sociobiologists have addressed criticisms of their position. 
*RXOG¶VDUJXPHQWWKDWVRFLRELRORJ\LVDµMXVW-VR¶H[SODQDWLRQRIEHKDYLRXULOOXPLQDWHVWKH
problem of behaviour that cannot readily be accounted for within the Hamilton-Dawkins 
sociobiological system, i.e., behaviour that appears not to make sense in terms of the 
imperatives of selfish genes. Sociobiologists have to come up with explanations for this kind 
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of behaviour²as non-selfish, non-rational acts are corrosive to their project²and have used 
+DPLOWRQ¶VUXOHDVWKHLUNH\UHVRXUFHIRUGRLQJWKLV7KHTXHVWLRQLVZKHWKHUWKLVexplains 
such acts or explains them away: Gould would argue the latter, as there do not appear to be 
any natural phenomena that cannot be so accounted for provided sufficient imagination is 
EURXJKWWREHDU+DPLOWRQ¶VUXOHUHVWVRQWKHFUHDWLYLW\RIWKHSHUVRQDSSO\LQJLWDQG²
because it is deemed to be correct, scientific and rational as an a priori matter²there are no 
µH[WHUQDO¶FULWHULDE\which its application can be judged from the sociobiological point of 
view. 
The (naïve) empiricism of utilitarianism, for Parsons, consists in its assumption that systems 
RIDFWLRQDUHQRPRUHWKDQWKHVXPRIWKHDFWVWKDWWKH\FRQVLVWLQµ7KLVLVWKHVLPplest and 
most obvious mode of employment of this conceptual scheme²the assumption, often naïvely 
made without full realisation of what it implies, that the concrete action systems being 
VWXGLHGDUHVLPSO\DJJUHJDWHVRIVXFKUDWLRQDOXQLWDFWV¶ (Parsons, 1937: 59). It makes no 
sense to talk about the actions of, for instance, the actions of a community, an organisation or 
an institution²the fact that these collective nouns exist should not fool one into believing 
that they can, therefore, engage in actions, have agency, etc., in their own right. This is the 
empiricism of VRFLRELRORJLFDOH[SODQDWLRQVZKLOHLWPLJKWPDNHVHQVHWRWDONRIµFRORQ\
RUJDQLVDWLRQ¶µSDFNEHKDYLRXU¶µKHUGPLJUDWLRQ¶DQGVRRQVXFKWHUPVVKRXOGDOZD\VEH
understood as shorthand for the behaviour of the individuals that comprise them. This is akin 
to methodological individualism, but only to a certain extent: although one can talk (in 
sociology) about the beliefs of a church or the movement of an army, a rigorous adherence to 
the principles of methodological individualism would insist that such statements can²at least 
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in principle²be restated in terms of the co-ordinated and negotiated attitudes, actions and 
DFWLYLWLHVRIDOOWKRVHLQGLYLGXDOVWKDWPDNHXSWKHµFKXUFK¶RUµDUP\¶,Q utilitarianism, as in 
sociobiology, no such co-RUGLQDWLRQRUQHJRWLDWLRQLVSRVVLEOHFROOHFWLYHQRXQVµFRORQ\¶
µSDFN¶µKHUG¶µFKXUFK¶µDUP\¶DUHQRWRULHQWDWHGWRE\LQGLYLGXDORUJDQLVPVEXWDUHUDWKHU
analytical constructs that provide for shorthand descriptions. A pack of wolves, for instance, 
is no more than the behaviour of its members, who appear to form a collective because of 
WKHLUUHSHDWHGDQGUHJXODUµDOWUXLVWLF¶EHKDYLRXUWRZDUGRQHDQRWKHU7KLVEHKDYLRXU
however, is simply what one woulGH[SHFWDV+DPLOWRQ¶VUXOHZRUNVLWVHOIRXWDFURVVDVHULHV
of logically independent interactions featuring the same personnel. Its regularity should not 
fool one into thinking eitKHUWKDWµWKHSDFN¶KDVDILUP ontological status or²even worse²
that partieVWRVXFKEHKDYLRXURULHQWDWHWRµWKHSDFN¶UDWKHUWKDQSDUWLFXODU other individuals) 
DVDµUHDO¶HQWLW\DVLILWVDSSDUHQWO\UHJXODUIHDWXUHVFRXOGEHUHOLHGXSRQWRSHUVLVW 
7KLVEULQJVXVWR3DUVRQV¶ILQDOFKDUDFWHULVWLFIHDWXUHRIXWLOLWDULDQLVPrandomness of ends. In 
many respects this falls out of the empiricism outlined above: to the extent that this 
empiricism is taken to describe what really happens in social action (as opposed to being an 
ideal typification, an abstraction, etc.) then there can be no meaningful co-ordination of ends 
without that co-ordination being in some respects teleological: 
If the concrete system be considered as analysable exclusively into rational unit acts it 
follows that though the conception of action as consisting in the pursuit of ends is 
fundamental, there is nothing in the theory dealing with the relations of the ends to each 
other, but only with the character of the means-HQGUHODWLRQVKLS«>7@KHIDLOXUHWRVWDWH
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anything positive about the relations of ends to each other can then have only one 
meaning²that there are no significant relations, that is, that ends are random in the 
statistical sense (Parsons, 1937: 59). 
7RWKHH[WHQWWKDWWKLVUDQGRPQHVVRIHQGVSRVHVDµSUREOHP¶IRUDQDO\VWVLWLVRQHWKDWFDQEH
resolved through a probabilistic redescription. Rational self-interest manifests itself in action 
occurring over time and with an orientation to what others, with identical motivation, are 
likely to do: apparently co-operative or altruistic behaviour can thus be made out to be self-
interested provided the relevant orientations of others are built into the description of the 
DFWRU¶VEHKDYLRXU7KXVIRUH[DPSOHRQHPLJKWGHIHULPPHGLDWHVDWLVIDFWLRQif that would 
lead to hostility from others. Although this might appear not to be self-interested, once the 
temporal and social dimension of action (or, as here, lack of action) is built in its self-serving 
nature can be demonstrated. 
In VRFLRELRORJ\µLQWHUHVWV¶DUHGHILQHGZLWKUHJDUGWRµVWUDWHJLHV¶DQGDJDLQVt a background of 
RWKHURUJDQLVPV¶EHKDYLRXUV:KHWKHURUQRWµVSLWHIXO¶EHKDYLRXUVHUYHVVHOI-interest depends 
on, among other things, whether other interacting organisms are also pursuing spiteful 
VWUDWHJLHV:KDWWXUQVRXWWREHµUDWLRQDOVHOI-LQWHUHVW¶ can only be determined over time, with 
the assumption of an evolutionary stable state or strategy and the presumption of perfect 
knowledge on the parts of each organism. Social stability, then, is built in to the system, but 
only insofar as the idea of co-ordinated ends or shared goals are ruled out a priori. 
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What Dawkins versus Wilson revealed 
To the extent that sociobiology is simply a utilitarian way of redescribing activities in 
ELRORJLFDOWHUPVLWVFODLPVWREHµVFLHQWLILF¶DUHFHQWUDOWRLWVVXUYLYDl. As we have seen, these 
claims have not weathered well. Claims about human behaviour have gained little traction 
outside the circle of already-committed evolutionary determinists; genomics is moving away 
IURPWKHLGHDWKDWWKHUHDUHJHQHVµIRU¶SDUWLFXODr traits, let alone behaviours; and natural-
KLVWRULFDOUHVHDUFKKDVQRWORFDWHGWKHNLQGVRIµIRUFHV¶+DPLOWRQDQGRWKHUVFODLPHG
µXQGHUSLQQHG¶DQLPDOEHKDYLRXUH[FHSWLQDUHVWULFWHGQXPEHURIFDVHV8 
7KLVLVZK\:LOVRQ¶VDSRVWDV\so scandalised Dawkins. :LOVRQ¶VHPEUDFHRIJURXSVHOHFWLRQ
over strict kin selection represents a move away from utilitarianism and towards a mode of 
explanation that recognises the importance of groups and their environments. Wilson, in 
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 ,WLVDOVRZRUWKQRWLQJWKDWWKHYHUVLRQRIµVFLHQFH¶DGYRFDWHGE\VRFLRELRORJLVWVDQGIHOORZ-
travellers is itself somewhat archiaic. In addition to their silence on developments in 
genomics, Wilson and Dawkins have signally failed to consider the possibility that their 
model of what science looks like may demand scrutiny. Dawkins, for instance, discards both 
Popper and Kuhn as mere relativists, XVHGE\µWUXWK-KHFNOHUV¶WRGHQ\WKHH[LVWHQFHRIDUHDO
worldDQGUHIHUVWRWKHSKLORVRSK\DQGVRFLRORJ\RIVFLHQFHDVµWKHORZ-grade intellectual 
poodling of pseudo-SKLORVRSKLFDOSRVHXUV¶ (Dawkins, 2004: 16±19). 
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short, has suggested that utilitarian explanations should be replaced by positivist ones. As 
Parsons points out, this is the logical conclusion of utilitarianism: 
«WKHHQGUHVXOWRUWKHXOWLPDWHGHWHUPLQDQWIDFWRUVDUHWKHVDPHDGDSWDWLRQWR
conditions through, in the last analysis, the influence of these conditions themselves. 
Indeed, in the very last analysis even the difference of process disappears, for in so far 
DVWKHµFRQGLWLRQV¶XOWLPDWHO\IRUPWKHVROHGHWHUPLQDQWVRIDFWLRQWKHVXEMHFWLYHDVSHFW
EHFRPHVPHUHO\DUHIOHFWLRQRIWKHVHµIDFWV¶LWLVSXUHO\HSLSKHQRPHQDO(Parsons, 1937: 
120±1). 
&RPSDUHWKLVZLWK:LOVRQ¶VDGYRFDF\RIJURXSVHOHFWLRQ 
The fourth phase [of the evolution of eusociality] is identification of the environmental 
forces driving group selection, which is the logical subject of combined investigations 
in population genetics and behavioral ecology. Research programs have scarcely begun 
in this area, in part because of the relative neglect of the study of the environmental 
selection forces that shape early eusocial evolution (Wilson, 2012a: 186). 
'DZNLQV¶VKRVWLOLW\WR:LOVRQ¶VPRYHLVQRWLQODUJHSDUWEHFDXVH:LOVRQLVDUJXLQJWKDWD
different perspective can be applied to accounting for insect behaviour. Rather, Dawkins is 
furious that the last remaining claim IRUVRFLRELRORJ\¶VµVFLHQWLILF¶VWDWXVLVEHLQJ
XQGHUPLQHG)ROORZLQJWKHIDLOXUHRI+DPLOWRQ¶VPRGHOHYHU\ZKHUHHOVHWKHZRUOG¶VOHDGLQJ
expert on social insects is claiming that it does not even apply in its exemplary field. Insect 
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behaviour, for Wilson, is better accounted for by looking at the conditions under which it 
occurs than with reference to the genetic imperatives of individual organisms. If he is right, 
the last bastion of sociobiological explanation will have fallen. 
7KHGLVSXWHRYHU:LOVRQ¶s application of group selection among biologists²the controversy 
played out in the journal Nature²is strictly about how best to account for the behaviour of 
insects. ,QGHHGWKHRULJLQDOSDSHUFRQFOXGHVµ>Z@e have not addressed the evolution of human 
social behaviour here, but parallels with the scenarios of animal eusocial evolution exist, and 
they are, wHEHOLHYHZHOOZRUWKH[DPLQLQJ¶(Nowak et al., 2010: 1062). The responses are 
not about humans at all, but about social insects.9 The controversy is not about sociobiology 
but rather about how best to account for the µRQHVSHFLDOGLIILFXOW\¶'DUZLQKDGWRGHDOZLWK
in a very restricted range of species. The dispute does not show that sociobiology is alive and 
ZHOOEXWUDWKHUWKDW+DPLOWRQ¶VUXOHPD\QRW even apply in its home domain. 
Sahlins (1976: 17±SRLQWHGRXWWKDWVRFLRELRORJ\¶VFODLPVWRDFFRXQWIRUKXPDQEHKDYLRXU
depend on the resilience of its theory of kin selection: 
This is true for several reasons. One is the significance of kinship in the so-called 
primitive societies, from which may be inferred its importance throughout the earlier 
and greater portion of human history ... But there is still another issue which makes the 
problem doubly critical ... [i]f kinship is not ordered by individual reproductive success, 
                                                 
9
 In one response, microbes and naked mole rats are also mentioned (Strassmann et al., 2011). 
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and if kinship is admittedly central to human social behaviour, then the project of an 
encompassing sociobiology collapses. 
More than forty years later this remains true, but the question being asked is not whether kin 
selection operates on humans as well as other animals but rather whether or not it can even be 
used to account for the behaviour of social insects. 
Wilson may be right. Some biologists have adopted his position. Others do not see what the 
problem is, as selection can be construed as operating at several levels: close relatedness, 
environment and group-level adaptation all being relevant factors (Korb and Heinze, 2004). 
Others, of course disagree. 'DZNLQV¶VUHYLHZRI:LOVRQ¶VERRNLQProspect, however, is not a 
defence of kin selection in insects but a defence of a way of describing activities tout court, a 
UHVWDWHPHQWRI+DPLOWRQ¶VUXOHDQGDEHZLOGHUHGobjection to how Wilson of all people could 
doubt its veracity. Dawkins is reasserting utilitarian explanations in the face of a positivist 
challenge, and Wilson is threatening a further two volumes to follow his Social Conquest of 
Earth WRVKRZKRZKLVQHZSRVLWLYLVWDSSURDFKFDQEHH[WHQGHGIURPµZKHUHZHFRPH
IURP¶WKURXJKµZKDWZHDUH¶DQGWRµZKHUHZHDUHJRLQJ¶(Sarchet, 2015: 29). If Dawkins 
SUHYDLOVDQGWKHHQWRPRORJLFDOFRQVHQVXVVXSSRUWV+DPLOWRQ¶VUXOHWKHILQDOµVFLHQWLILF¶
VWUDQGVXSSRUWLQJVRFLRELRORJLFDOXWLOLWDULDQLVPZLOOUHPDLQXQEURNHQ,I:LOVRQ¶VDUJXPent 
wins out, it will be used to make the kind of move from utilitarianism to positivism Parsons 
located in nineteenth century social thought, ironically starting around the time Darwin first 
published his Origin of Species. Whether sociobiology remains an eighteenth century mode 
of explanation or moves willy-nilly into the Victorian era, however, its reliance on a way of 
31 
accounting for (some of) the behaviour of a (very) narrow range of species is now in plain 
sight. 
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